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In the midst of one of the most severe financial meltdowns, Judge
Frank Easterbrook could have made matters worse for investors in an
industry described as a multi-trillion dollar "trough from which fund
managers, brokers and other insiders are steadily siphoning off an exces-
sive slice of the Nation's household, college and retirement savings."'
Furthermore, Judge Easterbrook's potential death blow was based on
what some describe as "an economic analysis that is ripe for reexamina-
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1. John P. Freeman et al., Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: New Evidence and a Fair Fiduciary
Duty Test, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 83, 140 n.219 (2008) (quoting Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald).
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tion."2 Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court mitigated much of
the potential impact that Judge Easterbrook's opinion in Jones v. Harris
Associates L.P.3 could have had on investor interests. However, it has
yet to be shown if the standard approved by the Supreme Court will
actually protect those interests.
In Judge Easterbrook's defense, the controversy surrounding sec-
tion 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("section 36(b)")
was in full swing well before the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jones.
The story of section 36(b) takes place in a unique sector of the financial
world: an industry in which the adviser who creates and operates a
mutual fund,' at a considerable charge to investors,6 also selects the
members of the board charged with negotiating that adviser's fee on
behalf of the investors.' And, if that were not enough, investors are
nearly powerless to replace the creator of a fund due to the insurmounta-
ble amount of dependency that investors have upon fund creators.8 For
decades, critics have been concerned about the inherent conflicts of
interest in such an industry.9 In fact, section 36(b) was created to ease
those concerns.o But, throughout its past, section 36(b) has been tossed
from one interpretation to another with one thing remaining constant:
2. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting).
3. 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
5. A mutual fund is a management company. The company combines "money from many
separate investors and then invests the whole in a portfolio consisting of stocks, bonds, and the
like." Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27,
2007), affd, 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
6. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 91 (noting that, as of November 2006, "annual
payments for fund [advisers] and their affiliates and service providers totaled more than $90
billion").
7. See John C. Coates IV & Glenn Hubbard, Competition in the Mutual Fund Industry:
Evidence and Implications for Policy, 33 J. CORP. L. 151, 158 (2007) ("A mutual fund is created
and operated by the fund's investment adviser, who also appoints the fund's initial board of
directors.").
8. Mutual fund investors are so dependent upon fund advisers that there is almost no risk of
termination. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 84 ("[A]dvisers fac[e] virtually no risk of getting
fired."); see also, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (noting that the adviser who created the fund, in 1991, has been reselected
by the board of directors every year).
9. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 155-56 (noting that the Wharton Report, issued
in 1962, along with a Securities and Exchange Commission report, issued in 1966, were issued in
response to concerns regarding fees in the mutual fund industry).
10. See SEC, REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,
H.R. REP. No. 2337, at 125-49, 154 (2d Sess. 1966); see also Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming
Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326-27 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that section 36(b) was enacted, in large
part, due to concerns that savings from economies of scale were not being passed along to
investors).
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Under section 36(b), the investors always lose."
This note argues that section 36(b) in its current form, as well as the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Jones, fail to protect investors. It proposes
that in drafting section 36(b), Congress passed the buck to the courts and
overlooked both the secretive nature of the mutual fund industry and the
motivating force that led to section 36(b)'s enactment. It also argues that
the Seventh Circuit crafted an unfair test for determining whether an
adviser breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b). Furthermore,
while the standard approved by the Supreme Court in its review of Jones
was a step in the right direction, it still utilizes unworkable factors and
will require congressional action to be effective. Part I of this note dis-
cusses the structure of a mutual fund and its inherent conflicts of inter-
est. Part II analyzes the standards applied in excessive fee cases, prior to
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Jones, and emphasizes the common
struggle investors faced in those suits. It also traces the legislative his-
tory forming the backdrop to the Gartenberg opinion; and focuses on
how different courts have applied the "Gartenberg factors"'2 for assess-
ing a breach of fiduciary duty claim under section 36(b). Part III exam-
ines the Seventh Circuit's choice in Jones to abandon the Gartenberg
factors and instead determine if a breach of fiduciary duty has occurred
based on the adviser's honesty during fee negotiations. Part IV analyzes
the Supreme Court's review of Jones which approved the Gartenberg
factors and rejected the Seventh Circuit's approach. Part V argues that
due to the inherent conflicts of interest discussed in Part I, a new stan-
dard for evaluating whether advisory fees are excessive is necessary. A
recommended test is set forth that incorporates only two factors: (1) fees
the adviser charges its institutional clients;13 and (2) the economies of
scale.' 4 It then explores an industry-wide reform, which would allow
section 36(b) to achieve its intended purpose. Finally, Part VI considers
the future of section 36(b) claims after the Supreme Court's review of
Jones.
I1. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 86 ("[N]o plaintiff has ever won a fee case brought
under section 36(b).").
12. In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982), the
Second Circuit "analyzed § 36(b) and created the framework that has served as the starting point
for interpreting a fund adviser's fiduciary duty." Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816,
821 (8th Cir. 2009).
13. Institutional funds include pension plans, trusts, etc. Unlike mutual funds, institutional
funds are not "captives" of their adviser because the adviser does not create the fund and
subsequently appoint and control up to sixty percent of the fund's board of directors. See
discussion infra Part I.B.
14. "Economies of scale" pricing is an economic theory that as a fund's assets increase, its
advisory fees per capita should decrease. Freeman et al. supra note 1, at 97 n.49. The theory
acknowledges that "it is not ten times more difficult for [an adviser] to decide to buy 100,000
shares of a company's stock rather than 10,000 shares." Id.
20111] 719
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I. MUTUAL FUNDS: AN ADVISER'S BALLGAME
Before diving into the controversial world of excessive fee jurispru-
dence, an overview of the structure and common practices of mutual
funds is necessary. A mutual fund is created by an adviser who sells
shares of the fund to investors, pooling the sums invested and purchas-
ing various securities." In turn, the adviser charges the investors a fee
for servicing the fund.16 As previously mentioned, the adviser also
selects the initial board of directors, who are charged with negotiating
the adviser's fee on behalf of the investors.17 Fees charged by the
adviser are subject to the board of directors' annual approval" and are
usually based on a percentage of the net assets of a particular fund
regardless of performance." But just how large are those fees?
A. Adviser Fees: A Great Deal-For Advisers
Adviser fees in the mutual fund industry are considerable to say the
least. In a study of the best-performing American stocks over a twenty-
five year period,2 0 two of the top three performing stocks were from
mutual fund advisers.2 1 One of those advisers, Franklin Resources, had
an overall return of 64,224% while the other, Eaton Lance, had an over-
all return of 38,444%.22 During that same period, the overall return of
the S&P 50023 was only 2000%.24 Even software giant Microsoft's over-
all return of 29,266% paled in comparison to the returns of leading
advisers.25
Adviser fees have an even greater impact than executive compensa-
tion on investors' returns and should be cause for greater concern to
15. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 158; see also Samuel S. Kim, Mutual Funds:
Solving the Shortcomings of the Independent Director Response to Advisory Self-Dealing Through
Use of the Undue Influence Standard, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 475, 479 (1998) ("Mutual funds are
defined as funds operated by investment companies that gather money from shareholders to invest
in stocks, bonds, and other securities.").
16. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 158.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See Kim, supra note 15, at 475-76. This payment structure also potentially perverts
advisers' duties to investors by encouraging advisers to maximize a fund's net assets even if an
increase in net assets does not benefit or is detrimental to individual investors. See Lyman
Johnson, A Fresh Look at Director "Independence": Mutual Fund Fee Litigation and Gartenberg
at Twenty-Five, 61 VAND. L. REv. 497, 504 (2008).
20. The study focused on the period beginning in 1983 and ending in 2008. See Freeman et
al., supra note 1, at 90.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The S&P 500 is an index of the prices of large-cap common stocks and is intended to be
representative of the industries in the American economy.
24. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 90.
25. Id.
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investors. Although adviser fees are, in many ways, a type of executive
compensation paid to external management, adviser fees have a much
more substantial and direct impact on the returns of investors.2 6 While
executive compensation typically has only a minor impact on the price
of a company's stock-if any impact at all-adviser fees come directly
from investors' returns.27 Thus, by raising an adviser's fee even by a
fraction of a percentage, investors' returns will be reduced by an equal
amount.28
To fully appreciate the controversy in the mutual fund industry, one
must also understand investors' practical concerns.
B. Mutual Fund Advisers: Here to Stay
Mutual fund advisers, as creators and operators of the fund, hold
the fund "captive." 29 In a typical business, a firm's management is free
to hire or fire outside service providers."o But, in the mutual fund indus-
try, the arrangement is much different. Rather than the typical internal
management structure, mutual fund advisers have de facto control of the
fund and its board." This arrangement is known as "external manage-
ment" in the mutual fund industry, and nearly all mutual funds are cap-
tives of this structure.32 The Senate Report accompanying the
amendments to the Investment Company Act of 1940 ("ICA"), which
created section 36(b), stated that:
Because of the unique structure of [the mutual fund] industry the
relationship between mutual funds and their investment adviser is not
the same as that usually existing between buyers and sellers or in
conventional corporate relationships. Since a typical fund is organ-
ized by its investment adviser which provides it with almost all man-
agement services and because its shares are bought by investors who
rely on that service, a mutual fund, cannot, as a practical matter sever
its relationship with the adviser. Therefore, the forces of arm's-length
bargaining do not work in the mutual fund industry in the same man-
26. See William A. Birdthistle, Investment Discipline: A Behavioral Approach to Mutual
Fund Jurisprudence, U. ILL. L. REv. at 29-30 (forthcoming 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract= 1412878.
27. "Even an admittedly vast sum [of executive compensation] is still almost sure to be
insignificant in comparison to the overall revenues of the corporation and thus to the growth or
income associated with the company's stock." Id.
28. Id.
29. Even the United States Supreme Court has recognized that mutual funds are "captive."
See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 84 n.5 (citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979)
(noting that a fund "cannot, as a practical matter sever its relationship with the adviser")).
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ner as they do in other sectors of the American economy.
In fact, mutual funds have been described as "captive shells" because of
the substantial amount of control that advisers exercise over them-
including the day-to-day management of the funds. 34 Advisers often
even supply a fund with the necessary office space to conduct
business.
In light of substantial amount of control advisers exercise over a
fund, investors should be concerned with their advisers' motivations.
Advisers, as external managers, are legally distinct from the funds they
manage, possessing their own boards of directors and answering to their
own shareholders. 36 Therefore, advisers are conflicted in that they owe a
fiduciary duty in respect to receipt of compensation3 7 and are also obli-
gated to maximize profits on behalf of their own shareholders. As indus-
try expert John C. Bogle3 ' explained, one almost always finds a mutual
fund
operated by external . . . management companies which seek to earn
high returns for fund investors, to be sure, but seek at the same time
to earn the highest possible returns for themselves. Some of these
companies are publicly-held, in which case their shares are held by
investors who own their shares for the same reason that investors
own Microsoft or General Motors: To make money for themselves.3 9
Problems of reliance upon advisers, though, are not the only con-
cerns faced by investors of mutual funds.
C. Mutual Fund Board of Directors: Investors' Paper Tiger
Investors seeking refuge from their captor advisers should be cau-
tious in placing any reliance upon their fund's board of directors. In
many mutual funds, the members of the board of directors also serve on
the boards of other mutual funds with the same adviser,4 0 and many are
handsomely compensated for their membership."1 Members of the board
33. Birdthistle, supra note 26, at 12 (citing S. REP. No. 91-184, at 5 (1970)).
34. See John A. Otoshi, Class Action Treatment of Shareholders' Suits Under Section 36(b) of
the Investment Company Act, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 2039 (1983).
35. Id.
36. See Kim, supra note 15, at 475.
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
38. John C. Bogle is the founder and former CEO of the Vanguard Group, one of the largest
investment management companies in the United States.
39. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 88.
40. See Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 328 (4th Cir. 2001)
("[M]embership on the boards of several funds within a mutual fund complex is the prevailing
practice in the industry.").
41. See id. (citing Krantz v. Fidelity Mgmt. & Research, 98 F. Supp. 2d 150, 157 (D. Mass.
2000)) (noting that compensation for directors, in some instances, ranges between $220,500 and
$273,500 per year).
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of directors, therefore, are doubly conflicted in that they are handpicked
by the adviser and have a substantial financial stake in preserving their
employment. To illustrate some of the effects of this financial conflict,
in a study conducted by Morningstar, an independent investment
research company,4 2 directors who received compensation in excess of
$100,000 approved advisory fee agreements with an average of fifteen
more basis points4 3 in expenses than directors who received lesser com-
pensation." Therefore, it seems that the greater the financial stake of
the board, the more willing the board becomes to approve to higher fees.
Directors' financial incentives are not the only reasons why inves-
tors should not rely upon their board of directors to safeguard their
investment interests. Under the ICA, mutual fund directors are also per-
mitted to have questionable connections to their fund's adviser. For
example, a person who is a brother-in-law, son-in-law, or grandson of
the investment adviser's CEO is not statutorily precluded from serving
as a director for a mutual fund of that adviser.4 6 In addition, mutual fund
directors are often influenced by their past business relations with advi-
sory firms. A study focusing in part on the selection process that occurs
when a fund needs to hire outside assistance, known as a subadviser, to
aid the primary adviser in managing the fund came to some suspicious
results. The study found that the more past business relations between a
fund's directors and a particular subadviser, the more likely the directors
were to select that subadviser to aid in managing the fund.4 Further-
more, it also found that past business relations played an important fac-
tor in the adviser's selection of directors for the adviser's newly formed
funds.4 8 Past business connections also proved to be a positive predictor
of both expense ratios and advisory fees.4 9 These numbers should come
as no surprise, and instead reinforce the skepticism surrounding direc-
tors' independence.
42. Morningstar's mutual fund rating system is quoted in the Wall Street Journal, the New
York Times, and other financial publications and was launched on the "belief that everyone should
have equal access to reliable, comprehensive investment information." See Kim, supra note 15.
43. Basis points are equal to 1/100th of a percentage point, or 0.01%.
44. See Kim, supra note 15, at 497.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
46. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 526. Cases have arisen in which a director has had family
ties to the adviser. See, e.g., In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc., 2004 WL 1305745, at *34 (Del. Ch.
May 3, 2004).
47. Camelia M. Kuhnen, Business Networks, Corporate Governance and Contracting in the
Mutual Fund Industry 4-6, 24 (Mar. 1, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Vanderbilt
Law Review), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=849705; see also Johnson, supra note 19, at
514.
48. See Johnson, supra note 19, at 514.
49. This means that the more past business relations between a particular subadviser and the
board, the greater the adviser fee as compared to the assets of the fund. Id.
2011] 723
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Unfortunately for investors, concerns regarding the questionable
relationships between advisers and directors are complicated by yet
another aspect of the interaction of the adviser and the board-how
much influence directors actually exercise over the conduct of the
adviser. As one mutual fund director observed:
Independence is a reflection of how you got on the board and how
you can be taken off the board. Who puts you there and who keeps
you there? Who can push you off? If the answer to those questions is
the management company, then you are not independent of the man-
agement company. And if you are not independent of the manage-
ment company, the notion that you can act effectively in an arm's-
length bargaining capacity, vis-A-vis the management company, is
silly.50
Some mutual fund directors have attempted to stand up for inves-
tors only to find themselves out of a job. For example, directors from the
Navellier Series Fund found themselves in a dispute with their fund's
adviser, Navellier Management Inc. ("NMI"), regarding NMI's failure
to provide the board with certain information pertaining to a proposed
merger." During this dispute, NMI's annual contract expired and the
board voted against renewal of the contract in favor of hiring a new
adviser, Massachusetts Financial Services.5 2 The board also voted for
the removal of NMI's president, Louis Navellier, from the fund's board
of directors." However, NMI and its president were not willing to go
quietly. Mr. Navellier filed a shareholder derivative suit54 against the
directors alleging a breach of the directors' fiduciary duties.55 Perhaps
the most significant aspect of the suit is that the directors were forced to
reach into their own pockets to pay their legal expenses. 56 Although the
directors eventually prevailed in the suit,57 the tactics of Mr. Navellier
and his company undoubtedly took a heavy financial toll on the direc-
tors. In addition to the shareholder derivative suit, NMI began a proxy
50. See Kenneth E. Scott, What Role Is There for Independent Directors of Mutual Funds?, 2
VILL. J.L. & INv. MGMT. 1, 4 (2000). Kenneth E. Scott is a director at American Century Funds
and Dresdner RCM Capital Funds. See id. at 1.
51. See David A. Sturms, Enhancing the Effectiveness of Independent Directors: Is the
System Broken, Creaking or Working?, I VILL. J.L. & INv. MGMT. 103, 106 (1999).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. A shareholder derivative suit is lawsuit brought by a shareholder on behalf of a
corporation against a third party, oftentimes someone within the corporation.
55. See McLachlan v. Simon, 31 F. Supp. 2d 731 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
56. See Sturms, supra note 51, at 106.
57. Id.
58. Many wondered why the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") did not step in to
support the directors. C. Meyrick Payne, a senior partner at Management Practice, a New York
consulting firm, stated that "in this case, the Navellier directors did precisely what they were
724 [Vol. 65:717
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battle to reinstate NMI as the fund's adviser and to remove the dissent-
ing directors from the board." Unfortunately for the directors, by the
end of the dispute, there were not enough shareholder votes to oust the
adviser, and the directors were forced to resign.60
The Navellier case is not the only example of directors losing their
jobs after challenging the adviser. Directors at the Yachtman Fund also
questioned the actions of their fund's adviser, Yachtman Asset Manage-
ment ("Yachtman"), and, like the directors from the Navellier Series
Fund, paid the price for their dissidence. Specifically, the directors were
concerned about an apparent deviation in investment technique and vio-
lations by Yachtman employees of the mutual fund's code of ethics.61
The directors also expressed concern regarding the disappointing per-
formance of the fund. 62 In response, Yachtman sent the directors a letter
stating that if the directors did not resign then they would be faced with
a proxy battle seeking their replacement. 63 The letter also threatened per-
sonal financial repercussions to the directors if they attempted to chal-
lenge the proxy statement.' The directors, however, refused to resign. 5
In response, Yachtman filed suit to force a special meeting of sharehold-
ers to remove the directors from the board.66 The directors, like the
directors from the Navellier Series Fund, were forced to pay their legal
fees from their own pockets. 67 The directors appealed to the SEC to
intervene by asserting that they were being punished by Yachtman for
fulfilling their duties as watchdogs of the fund. 68 The directors also
claimed that Yachtman was attempting to take control of the fund and
that if Yachtman were successful then its actions would have a chilling
effect on directors at other funds.69 Unfortunately for the directors, the
SEC did not come to their aid, and Yachtman was able to obtain enough
votes from the proxy battle to remove the directors from the board.7 o
supposed to do . . . . But there was a moment when you wondered whether the SEC should have
been a little more supportive." Edward Wyatt, Empty Suits In the Board Room: Under Fire,
Mutual Fund Directors Seem Increasingly Hamstrung, N.Y. TUWEs, June 7, 1998, at 31.
59. A proxy battle or proxy contest is a struggle between two corporate factions to obtain the
votes of uncommitted shareholders. BLACK'S LAw DIcrIONARY 1263 (8th ed. 2004).
60. See Sturms, supra note 51, at 107.
61. Id. at 109.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 109-10.
65. Id.
66. See David J. Carter, Mutual Fund Boards and Shareholder Action, 3 VIL. J.L. & INv.
MGMT. 1, 28 (2001).
67. Id.
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Considering the outcomes of both the Yachtman and Navellier disputes,
investors can hardly be expected to rest easy by relying on the power of
the board.
In light of directors' financial conflicts, the oftentimes questionable
relationships between advisers and directors, and advisers' ability to
force out directors who attempt to meddle with their control, it is no
wonder that many industry experts criticize the protection of the board.
For example, industry expert John C. Bogle described mutual fund
boards as "lapdogs" to their advisers rather than "watchdogs" for inves-
tors. Mr. Bogle was not alone in his criticism of the effectiveness of
mutual fund boards of directors. Financial expert Warren Buffett but-
tressed Bogle's assertion by stating that the "boardroom atmosphere
almost invariably sedates [directors'] fiduciary genes."7 2
II. EXCESSIVE FEE JURISPRUDENCE: DIFFERENT STANDARDS,
SAME RESULTS
Investors, therefore, are presented with equally unappealing
choices: continue dealing with the initial adviser and allow the board of
directors to negotiate fees with their "boss" 7 or look for an alternative
fund in an industry in which nearly all funds have the same conflicted
management structure. Understandably, the conflicted relationship
between advisers and investors has set the stage for a bevy of litigation
regarding excessive fees.74
A. The Waste Test: The Wrong Standard for the Job
Prior to the enactment of section 36(b), if an investor sought to
invalidate an excessive fee, the investor would have to deal with the
state courts' "waste test."7 ' The waste test was proffered in Saxe v.
Brady. The investors in Saxe claimed that their adviser, Investment
Management Company ("IMC"), violated its duty to the investors by
charging an excessive fee despite gaining approval of the fee agreement
71. Anna Leist, Voting with Their Feet and Dollars: The Role of Investors and the Influence
of the Mutual Fund Market in Regulating Fees, 51 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 282 (2009)
(citation omitted).
72. Id. (citation omitted).
73. See Daniel D. Birk, Jones v. Harris Associates L.P. and the Limits of Public Choice
Textualism 20 (April 24, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=
1392562 (noting that due to inherent conflicts of interest), "[tlhe person agreeing to the fee . . . is
essentially in the employ of the person demanding it.").
74. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 155 (noting that cases involving mutual funds
accounted for nearly ten percent of all federal securities class action suits in 2003 and 2004).
75. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 124-25.
76. 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962).
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from the directors and a majority of investors." The investors argued
that the fees charged were so excessive that they constituted an illegal
waste of the fund's assets, which required unanimous investor
approval.78 Additionally, the investors claimed that the directors of the
fund failed to protect investors' interests due to a conflict of interest,
which resulted from certain directors owning stock in the parent com-
pany of IMC. 79 According to the investors, those directors who owned
stock in IMC's parent company manipulated the other directors and the
investors by inappropriately allocating costs and understating profits in
order to gain approval of the agreement.so
The standard that the court set out proved to be exceedingly diffi-
cult. Because the investors had ratified the fee agreement, they had to
prove that the fee agreement was an illegal waste." To show that the
agreement was an illegal waste the investors had to prove that the agree-
ment was one that "no person of ordinary, sound business judgment
would be expected to entertain in view that the consideration [of advi-
sory services rendered] was a fair exchange for the value which was
given."82 Conversely, all that IMC had to show to defend against the
claim was that any reasonable person would view the agreement as a fair
exchange." In applying the standard, the court relied heavily on fees
charged to investors in other funds as well the investors' approval of the
fee agreement despite the fact that the fee had quadrupled in just eight
years. 84 After conceding that "the [adviser's] profits are certainly
approaching the point where they are outstripping any reasonable rela-
tionship to expenses and effort even in a legal sense,"" the court con-
cluded that the fee agreement was not unreasonable.
Saxe illustrates the near impossibility of prevailing under the waste
test. The waste test is premised on the notion that courts should not
second guess the decisions of directors because directors are negotiating
77. Id. at 604.
78. The fee agreement was not approved by every investor. Therefore, if the investors could
prove that such agreement was an illegal waste, the investor ratification, which was not
unanimous, would not have saved IMC from liability. See id. at 605.
79. The affected directors owned stock in Long Inc., the parent company of IMC. Id.
80. The investors claimed that Long Inc., IMC's parent company, had inappropriately
allocated some of its own expenses, in the amount of $978,416, to IMC in order to deceive
investors of the true profitability of the fund. Id. at 606.
81. Id. at 605.
82. Id. at 606; Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 124-25; see also Kim, supra note 15, at 483
(citing Steiner v. Meyerson, Civ. A. No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1995)).
83. Saxe, 184 A.2d at 606.
84. Id. at 611 (noting that between 1952 and 1960, the fee grew from $680,000 to
$2,780,000).
85. Id. at 616.
86. Id. at 618.
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in the best interests of investors.87 If the directors are conflicted, the
waste test "cures" the conflict by requiring investor ratification of the
directors' actions. Investors who still believe that they are being charged
an excessive fee despite investor ratification, like the investors in Saxe,
must then prove an illegal waste of fund assets. To defend against such a
claim an adviser needs only to demonstrate that any reasonable person
might conclude that the deal made sense."
The problem with applying the waste test in the mutual fund indus-
try stems from the industry's unique structure. In reality, boards of
directors are created and controlled by their adviser." Directors can be
further conflicted by other substantial conflicts, such as ownership in the
parent company of their fund's adviser.90 And, even if directors attempt
to stand up for investors they typically lack the power to effectuate real
changes in the behavior of their adviser which was illustrated by the
Navellier and Yachtman cases.
Investors and Congress 91 soon realized that investor interests were
not adequately represented in the fee negotiation room.92 Specifically,
concerns grew that advisers were not passing along the savings that
resulted from economies of scale-the cost advantages that a business
obtains due to expansion-to investors.93 The SEC commissioned a
study by the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce.94 The Wharton
Report was subsequently published in 1962.9' The study found that "the
structure of the [mutual fund] industry, even as regulated by the [Invest-
ment Companies] Act, had proven resistant to efforts to moderate advi-
87. See Birk, supra note 73, at 20 ("Corporate waste is built upon an assumption that the
board in most circumstances is negotiating in the best interests of the beneficiaries.").
88. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 125.
89. See id. ("[Tlhe board is for all intents and purposes the creation of the adviser.... [Flund
directors often sit on the boards of twenty or thirty of the funds organized by the same adviser
90. In Saxe, certain directors on the fund's board were also shareholders in the adviser's
parent company. See Saxe, 184 A.2d at 604.
91. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 125 ("Congress determined that, because 'marketplace
forces are not likely to operate as effectively,' in the mutual fund industry, the corporate waste test
was 'unduly restrictive' and needed to be relaxed.") (citing S. REP. No. 91-184, at 5 (1970)).
92. See Birk, supra note 73, at 20 ("[T]he independent board structure had also proved
inadequate to resolve conflicts of interest leading to excessive fees . . . .").
93. See id. at 19-20 (noting that the SEC and Congress began to "fear that fund advisers were
failing to pass along economies of scale to the fund customers."). Economies of scale cause the
average cost per unit to fall as scale is increased. Thus, a service provider, like a mutual fund
adviser, can spread the same fixed costs over more investors' accounts and incur less cost per
account.
94. A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS PREPARED FOR THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
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sor compensation."9 6 The Wharton Report, therefore, became the
impetus for abandoning the waste test and providing investors with
greater protection.
B. Section 36(b): A Failed Attempt to Level the Playing Field
In response to these growing concerns, Congress enacted section
36(b). 7 Under section 36(b), an adviser has a fiduciary duty with respect
to the receipt of fees." In addition, section 36(b) grants investors a cause
of action against advisers for a breach of fiduciary duty.9 9 With respect
to such cause of action, an investor is not required to allege personal
misconduct on the part of the adviser.'0 Most importantly, the investor
is required to carry the burden of proving a breach.101
In drafting section 36(b), Congress left much to be decided by the
courts. As stated above, section 36(b) places a fiduciary duty upon
advisers with respect to the receipt of fees.102 Congress's formulation of
the adviser's duty in section 36(b) does little more than state the exis-
tence of a fiduciary duty without expounding any of the specifics of such
duty. The term "fiduciary duty" can mean anything from the most mini-
mal requirements of a bailee to the far more onerous responsibilities of
an executor.10 3 Justice Felix Frankfurter summarized the ambiguity of
the term:
But to say that a man is a fiduciary only begins the analysis; it gives
direction to further inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obliga-
tions does he owe as a fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to
discharge these obligations? And what are the consequences of his
deviation from duty? 10
Presumably, Congress intended to incorporate the familiar com-
mon-law principles associated with fiduciary duty into section 36(b). It
is the "well-established rule of construction that [w]here Congress uses
terms that have accumulated settled meaning under ... the common law,
a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress
means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.' "105 Under
96. Id. at 28-30, 34, 66-67.
97. See id.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2006).
99. See id.
100. See id. ("It shall not be necessary to allege or prove that any defendant engaged in
personal misconduct .... .").
101. See id. ("[P]laintiff shall have the burden of proving a breach of fiduciary duty.").
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
103. See Birdthistle, supra note 26, at 35.
104. Id. at 35-36.
105. Brief for Petitioners at 20, Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-
586) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999)).
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the common law, a fiduciary has a strict duty of loyalty to act in the best
interests of the beneficiary. 10 6 If a fiduciary negotiates with its benefici-
ary in a situation in which the fiduciary has an interest in the negotiation,
the fiduciary must comply with two requirements.o' First, the fiduciary
must provide full and accurate disclosure of all the material facts.'08
And, second, the fiduciary must be fair to the beneficiary.'" If the bene-
ficiary fails to provide full and accurate disclosure of all the material
facts or acts unfairly towards the beneficiary, then any agreement
entered into is not binding on the beneficiary. 1 o
By failing to elaborate upon the details of an adviser's fiduciary
duty, Congress seems to have paid lip service to reform while passing
the buck along to the courts to address the issue. For that reason, section
36(b) has failed to achieve its intended purpose of investor protection
and has forced courts to fashion interpretations that yield entirely one-
sided results. The failure of section 36(b) is due, in large part, to the
secretive nature of the mutual fund industry. Investors in section 36(b)
suits are expected to carry the burden of proof by proffering evidence
that even the SEC is unable to obtain."' Section 36(b) also failed to
address the issue of calculating the savings from economies of scale-
the motivating force in section 36(b)'s enactment."' Therefore, despite
being interpreted under multiple frameworks, section 36(b) suits do not
present investors with a realistic chance to prevail.
C. The Gartenberg Standard
In Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 113 the
court attempted to outline an adviser's fiduciary duty under section
36(b) by crafting what are now known as the "Gartenberg factors." In
Gartenberg, investors in a mutual fund sued their adviser, Merrill
Lynch, alleging the company violated its fiduciary duty under section
36(b) by collecting excessive fees."' The district court held that Merrill
Lynch had not breached its fiduciary duty because it charged fees com-
106. Id.
107. Id. at 21-22.
108. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b. (2003)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 23 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 170 (2003)).
111. The mutual fund industry is so protective of its financial information that even the SEC's
former Chief Economist, Erik Sirri, was unable to obtain the necessary data to conduct revenue,
costs, and profitability analyses of the industry while serving in the SEC. See Freeman et al.,
supra note 1, at 131.
112. The SEC is also unable to obtain the necessary information to calculate the savings that
advisers enjoy from economies of scale. See id. at 131 n.188.
113. 528 F. Supp. 1038 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
114. Id. at 1040.
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parable to those charged throughout the mutual fund industry."' The
court rejected the investors' contention that the standard for determining
a breach of fiduciary duty under section 36(b) should be whether the
adviser charged "reasonable" fees.' 1 6 Instead, the court focused prima-
rily on whether the fees were "fair" in relation to the fees charged by
other advisers to other money market funds.I"
On appeal, the Second Circuit took a different approach to finding a
breach of fiduciary duty under section 36(b). The court began its analy-
sis by noting the competitive shortcomings among mutual funds." 8 As a
result of these shortcomings, the court held that the test for a fee was
whether it "represents a charge within the range of what would have
been negotiated at arm's-length in light of all the surrounding circum-
stances.""' 9 In doing so, the appellate court explicitly rejected the district
court's suggestion that reliance on prevailing industry advisory fees will
satisfy the fiduciary duty found in section 36(b).12 0 The court then listed
six factors (now known as the Gartenberg factors) for assessing whether
the fee negotiation took place at arm's length:
(1) the nature and quality of the services provided by the adviser; (2)
the profitability of the mutual fund to the adviser; (3) the extent to
which "fall-out" benefits inured to the adviser; (4) the economies of
scale realized by the adviser; (5) the fee structures of comparable
funds; and (6) the independence and conscientiousness of the board
of directors. 121
After applying these factors, however, the Second Circuit reached the
same result as the lower court-Merrill Lynch did not breach its fiduci-
ary duty.12 2
115. Id. at 1068.
116. Id. at 1045-53.
117. Id. A money market fund is comparable to a mutual fund. The main difference between
the two is that money market funds, such as the fund in Gartenberg, invest primarily in short-term
money market securities. Id. at 1040. A mutual fund, on the other hand, is likely to invest in a
broader portfolio of stocks and bonds. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04-C-8305, 2007 WL
627640, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007). However, the same excessive advisory fee analysis may
be used regardless of the fund type. See, e.g., Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694
F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 906 (1983) (pronouncing what would come to
be known as the "Gartenberg factors" for analyzing a claim that a money market fund adviser
charged excessive fees); Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001)
(applying the Gartenberg factors in a case involving a mutual fund).
118. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925.
119. Id. at 928.
120. Id. at 929.
121. Id. at 928-31.
122. Id. at 934.
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D. The Gartenberg Factors: Consistently Inconsistent
Since the pronouncement of the Gartenberg factors in 1982, courts
have struggled to determine their proper application. For example, the
Eighth Circuit, took a broad view of the Gartenberg test in Gallus v.
Ameriprise Financial, Inc.123 In analyzing investors' excessive fee
claim, 124 the court stated that "[t]he Gartenberg case demonstrates one
way in which a fund adviser can breach its fiduciary duty; but it is not
the only way." 12 5 The court went on to hold that an adviser may also
breach its fiduciary duty by lying or concealing information during fee
negotiations.12 6 In essence, the Eighth Circuit crafted its own, two-part
test for excessive fee cases: (1) satisfaction of the Gartenberg factors;
and (2) "a duty to be honest and transparent throughout the negotiation
process." 1 27 While the Eighth Circuit's newly added prong is beneficial
to investors in theory, the decision demonstrates the inconsistency of the
application of Gartenberg and, in practice, does little to expand
disclosure.
In Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming International, Inc.,12 8 the Fourth
Circuit applied Gartenberg,129 but nonetheless failed to analyze all six
factors. The facts of the case were substantially similar to those in
Gartenberg; mutual fund investors sued their advisor under section
36(b).1 3 0 The investors alleged that Rowe Price charged excessive fees
because the adviser managed to increase its earnings by more than
twenty percent even though the fund was underperforming. 3' However,
the Fourth Circuit only analyzed the investor's breach of fiduciary duty
claim under the first Gartenberg factor.3 2 The court in effect found the
plaintiffs' failure "to allege sufficient facts about the services that
defendants offered in return for [advisory fees]"l 3 3 to be dispositive.1'34
Thus, the case was dismissed for failure to state a claim. 35
123. 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009). Although the Gallus decision was not rendered prior to
Jones, it is a notable example of a subsequent court applying the Gartenberg factors. Id.
124. Id. at 818.
125. Id. at 823.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 327.
130. Id. at 325. The investors also made allegations regarding violations of other provisions of
the ICA, but failed to overcome the statutory presumptions of those claims. Id. at 331.
131. Id. at 327.
132. Id. ("[Iln order to determine whether a fee is excessive for purposes of Section 36(b), a




135. Id. at 328.
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The court's reasoning in Migdal illustrates the difficulty investors
often experience in section 36(b) suits under Gartenberg. By requiring
an investor to make allegations regarding a mutual fund's finances (such
as the relationship between the fees charged and the services rendered),
the Gartenberg factors ignore the difficulty of obtaining information in
the mutual fund industry.136
III. Tm JONES DECISION: GARTENBERG HAS JUST
LEFT THE BUILDING
Federal securities laws, of which the Investment Company Act is one
component, work largely by requiring disclosure and then allowing
price to be set by competition in which investors make their own
choices. Plaintiffs do not contend that Harris Associates pulled the
wool over the eyes of the disinterested trustees or otherwise hindered
their ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services.
- Chief Judge Easterbrook13 7
Both investor concerns over excessive fees and the Gartenberg fac-
tors were also addressed in Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.13 8 In Jones,
Harris Associates ("Harris") served as investment adviser to a complex
of mutual funds.13 9 The plaintiffs were shareholders of three funds ("the
funds") in the complex.140 Pursuant to advisory contracts, Harris
received a fee that was approved annually by the funds' board of direc-
tors. 14 1 For the fiscal year ending in September 2004, Harris charged the
funds over $46 million more than the previous year. 14 2 Additionally,
during the relevant time period,14 3 Harris charged plaintiffs significantly
more than its institutional clients with similar investment strategies.1 '44
In August 2004, plaintiffs brought suit, alleging that Harris
breached its fiduciary duty under section 36(b) by charging excessive
advisory fees.145 Specifically, the investors alleged that Harris had
impermissibly retained the savings that resulted from economies of scale
136. Even if an investor is lucky enough to obtain the necessary information, the investor will
then have to deal with dueling expert analyses. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 86
("Gartenberg demands fund shareholders prove their case with evidence that is usually hidden
and, once found, subject to bitter disputes between the parties' experts.").
137. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2008).
138. No.04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 27, 2007).
139. Id. at *1.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Respectively, the three funds were charged an additional $13,577,704; $23,529,291; and
$9,263,669 over the previous year. Id. at *1-2.
143. See id. at *1 n.2 (noting that Section 36(b) of the ICA limits damages to the year
preceding the commencement of the action).
144. Id. at *1-2.
145. Id. at *2.
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as the fund grew. 146 The investors-like the investors in Migdal-were
unable to proffer the necessary evidence. In particular, the investors
were unable to calculate precisely how much Harris had saved by way of
economies of scale.14 7
The lower court employed the Gartenberg factors to determine if
the fees charged by Harris were the product of arm's-length bargain-
ing.148 The court considered the fees Harris charged its institutional cli-
ents but found that "the amounts paid by different parties establish a
range of prices that investors were willing to pay" for advice. 149 This
range included institutional clients at the low end and mutual fund cli-
ents at the high end. 5 o Because Harris's fees "fell within this spectrum
of fees paid by both mutual funds and unaffiliated institutional clients,"
the court concluded they were not excessive."' The court also noted the
absence of evidence regarding the alleged savings that Harris enjoyed as
a result of economies of scale. 1 52 Thus, Harris's motion for summary
judgment was granted.'
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed."' Never-
theless, in doing so, the court explicitly disapproved the Gartenberg fac-
tors.'55 The court claimed that the "fiduciary duty" required by section
36(b) did not impose rate regulation; rather, it required an adviser's hon-
esty and candor during fee negotiations. 156 As long as an adviser was
honest throughout the process, it did not violate section 36(b). 5 7
The Seventh Circuit then left the door open to fee comparisons
among like funds in extraordinary circumstances.15 ' Even under such
extraordinary circumstances, however, the comparison was to be limited
to other mutual funds-not institutional funds.'
The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc.160 Five
146. Id. at *6-7.
147. Id. at *7.
148. Id.




153. Id. at *9.
154. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2008).
155. Id. at 632 ("Having had another chance to study this question, we now disapprove the
Gartenberg approach.").
156. Id. ("A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but is not subject to a cap
on compensation.").
157. Id.
158. Id. ("It is possible to imagine compensation so unusual that a court will infer that deceit
must have occurred . . . but no court would inquire whether a salary normal among similar
institutions is excessive.").
159. See id. at 634.
160. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 729 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
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judges dissented. 161 The dissenters stated that the panel based its "rejec-
tion of Gartenberg mainly on an economic analysis that is ripe for reex-
amination." 162 They were also concerned with "growing indications that
executive compensation in large publicly traded firms often is excessive
because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to police compen-
sation."l 6 3 The dissenters asserted that, pursuant to Gartenberg, Harris's
fee should have been compared with both the fees charged by other
mutual fund advisers and the fees Harris charged its institutional
clients."
IV. SUPREME COURT's REVIEW OF JONES: WELCOME
BACK GARTENBERG
The Supreme Court agreed to review Jones in March 2009.165 In
the opinion, the Supreme Court noted that "until the Seventh Circuit's
decision [in Jones], something of a consensus had developed regarding
the standard set forth over 25 years ago in Gartenberg."l66 According to
the Supreme Court, "both petitioners and respondent generally endorse
the Gartenberg approach, although they disagree in some respects about
its meaning."167
The first point of contention was whether comparisons to the fees
charged to institutional clients were a pertinent factor under
Gartenberg.'68 The Supreme Court decided that under 36(b) there was
no "categorical rule regarding the comparisons of the fees charged [to]
different types of clients." 6 9 Therefore, the Supreme Court welcomed
comparisons to the fees charged to institutional clients so long as the
comparisons are given "the weight that they merit in light of the similar-
ities and differences between the services that the clients in question
require . . . ."170 The Supreme Court warned that "[i]f the services ren-
dered are sufficiently different that a comparison is not probative, then
courts must reject such a comparison."' 7 '
The next issue the Supreme Court addressed was the weight to be
given to board approval of a fee agreement. In the Supreme Court's
view, a reviewing court must take into account "both procedure and sub-
161. Id.
162. Id. at 730 (Posner, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 732.
165. Sam Manudi, Government Takes Side of Investors, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2009, at Cll.
166. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1425 (2010).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1428.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1429.
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stance."1 7 2 When a board's "process for negotiating and reviewing
investment-adviser compensation is robust, a reviewing court should
afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining pro-
cess."'17 On the other hand, "where the board's process was deficient or
the adviser withheld important information, the court must take a more
rigorous look at the outcome."174 However, regardless of the sufficiency
of the process implemented in approving a fee agreement, a reviewing
court could still invalidate the fee if it "'is so disproportionately large
that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and
could not have been the product of arm's-length bargaining.' "175
Finally, the Supreme Court disapproved of the standard set forth by
the Seventh Circuit. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the Seventh Cir-
cuit erred "[b]y focusing almost entirely on the element of disclosure
. . ."176 Although Gartenberg may "lack sharp analytical clarity," it
"accurately reflects the compromise that is embodied in [Section] 36(b)
and ... has provided a workable standard for nearly three decades." 7
But the Supreme Court declined to address whether the mutual fund
industry is competitive, as Judge Easterbrook asserted, reasoning that
"the debate . . . is a matter for Congress, not the courts."178 After the
Supreme Court's review of Jones, courts should implement the
Gartenberg factors but allow for comparisons to institutional clients in
light of the similarities and differences of the funds as a part of the
analysis of "the fee structures of comparable funds." 179
V. ANALYSIS: THE PROPER APPROACH TO EVALUATING EXCESSIVE
ADVISORY FEES
Although the Supreme Court's review of Jones is a step in the right
direction, it will still require a reviewing court to analyze unworkable
factors. The Supreme Court should have adopted a new test, which
focuses solely on two points of interest: (1) compare the fees an adviser
charges its mutual fund versus its institutional clients; and (2) determine
whether the adviser has properly adjusted its fees based on the econo-
mies of scale. But to make this hypothetical test effective, the mutual
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1430.
175. Id. at 1429-30 (quoting Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923,
928 (2d Cir. 1982)).
176. Id. at 1430.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1431.
179. See Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 928-31.
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fund industry will need to undergo certain reforms that expand the cur-
rent disclosure requirements.
A. Applying the Gartenberg Factors in Their Entirety Has Proven
To Be Unworkable
The Gartenberg court provided some guidance in excessive advi-
sory fee cases, but it established a test that has yielded inequitable
results. Specifically, four of the six Gartenberg factors have proven to
be unworkable and thus should be disregarded. Each of the four
uniquely flawed factors have either been misapplied or, more com-
monly, rendered ineffective by the courts.
1. THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE SERVICES PROVIDED
BY THE ADVISER
The first problematic Gartenberg factor is the nature and quality of
the services provided by the adviser. As part of this analysis, the court
begins by considering exactly what types of services the adviser pro-
vides to the fund.s 0 Does the adviser limit its services to investment-
related strategies, or (as is becoming more prevalent) does it also pro-
vide non-investment services, such as accounting? After determining
what services the adviser provides, the court must assess the quality of
those services.1 8 ' Although this analysis may seem reasonable in theory,
there is no way for courts to gauge the true value of either investment-
related or ancillary services. Consequently, advisers are given significant
latitude to justify their fees. 18 2
For example, advisers have successfully defended the relationship
between fees charged and investment-related services by pointing to a
mutual fund's strong overall performance.18 3 Conversely, however,
courts have discounted the weight to be given to a fund's poor perform-
ance by stating that "[w]hile performance may be marginally helpful in
evaluating the services which a fund offers, allegations of
underperformance alone are insufficient to prove that an investment
adviser's fees are excessive." 84 This treatment is indicative of courts'
willingness to favor an adviser's fee justifications when funds over-per-
form while still giving it the benefit of the doubt when funds
180. Caroline J. Dillon, Survey: Do You get what You Pay for? A Look at the High Fees and
Low Protections of Mutual Funds, 2006 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 281, 294 (2006).
181. See id. at 295.
182. See id.
183. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., 875 F.2d 404, 409 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the services
provided by the adviser had been "only of the highest quality" because the fund "had the third best
performance out of 56 prime money funds").
184. Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2001).
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underperform. Additionally, advisers seeking to explain away ancillary
fees can find refuge in SEC Rule 12b-1.1' Courts have interpreted the
rule as allowing advisers to boost current service fees in order to cover
previous expenses.1 16 Thus, advisers can justify potential disparities
between fees charged and secondary services rendered by simply refer-
encing expenses incurred in the past."
2. THE FUND'S PROFITABILITY TO THE ADVISER
The second Gartenberg factor, the fund's profitability to the
adviser, is equally troublesome. To determine an adviser's profits, courts
are charged with the "virtually impossible task" of calculating the
adviser's costs in servicing the fund.1 8 Unfortunately, such data is not
published.'8 9 The SEC's Chief Economist has gone so far as to admit
that this necessary data is unobtainable. 190 Moreover, even when some
data is available, disputes often arise over cost allocation issues.1 9' For
instance, when advisers provide multiple services to a fund, there is con-
siderable room for disagreement over the cost of each separate function.
The Gartenberg court itself encountered this problem. In Gartenberg,
the Second Circuit considered three estimates of processing costs. 92 The
first estimate showed a 38.4% profit, the second estimate showed a 9.8%
profit, and the third estimate showed a $7.7 million loss.19 3 Similarly, in
a subsequent excessive fees case, the Second Circuit heard contrasting
expert testimony indicating that an adviser either enjoyed a $47.5 mil-
lion profit or incurred a $77 million loss.194 Presented with such gaping
estimates, it is unreasonable for courts to somehow assign an accurate
cost to advisers' services.
Additionally, even when an adviser is proven to have experienced
extreme profits, courts have effectively rendered this factor inconse-
quential by refusing to set an upward limit on profit margins. In particu-
lar, the Second Circuit has held that a profit margin of over 77% did not
render an advisory fee excessive.195 The court articulated that such a
185. 17 C.F.R. § 270.12b-1 (2010).
186. See ING Principal Prot. Funds Derivative Litig., 369 F. Supp. 2d 163, 169 (D. Mass.
2005).
187. See Dillon, supra note 180, at 295.
188. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 962, 978 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
aff'd, 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987).
189. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 131.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1982).
193. Id.
194. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
195. Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 962, 988 (S.D.N.Y. 1987),
affd, 835 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987). The 2nd Circuit did not technically render this holding but
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profit margin, without more, was not dispositive on the issue of whether
the adviser had breached its fiduciary duty. 96 Hence, the question
remains-why analyze a fund's profitability to an adviser at all if this
factor carries no bite?
3. FALL-OUT BENEFITS
The third Gartenberg factor requires consideration of the fall-out
benefits that an adviser realizes as a result of its relationship to a fund.'97
Again, the inefficacy of this factor is evidenced in the Gartenberg deci-
sion itself. In Gartenberg, the investors alleged that the adviser gained
significant "fall-out" financial benefits "in the form of comnuissions on
non-Fund securities business generated by Fund customers."1 "Non-
fund" business is equity security business-conducted between inves-
tors in a mutual fund and the fund's adviser-that is unrelated to the
mutual fund.'99 The court found that up to 38% of fund customers did
non-fund business with the adviser.20 Nonetheless, the court held that
the investors had failed to meet their burden of showing that the com-
missions earned from this additional business were substantial enough to
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under section 36(b).20' In essence,
while proving that the adviser had realized fall-out benefits, the inves-
tors could not quantify their actual value.
Unfortunately, it is difficult for investors to ever quantify the value
of fall-out benefits. The Gartenberg court surmised that "[i]t would not
seem impossible, through use of today's sophisticated computer equip-
ment and statistical techniques, to obtain estimates of such [bene-
fits]." 20 2 However, public disclosures of advisers' various business
interactions with a fund lack necessary detail.20 3 The disclosures typi-
cally only summarize business dealings, making it nearly impossible for
investors to ferret out useful data.20 Moreover, advisers can always
argue that a certain percentage of fund customers would have done non-
rather upheld the lower court's conclusion. The court qualified its holding in a footnote by stating:
"The Court wishes to make clear that it is not holding that a profit margin of up to 77.3% can
never be excessive. In fact, in other circumstances, such a profit margin could very well be
excessive. For example, if advisory services being challenged were not of the highest quality and
if the directors were not so obviously qualified, fully informed, and conscientious, a similar fee
structure could violate Section 36(b)." Id. at 989 n.77.
196. Id.
197. Dillon, supra note 180, at 297.





203. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 137.
204. See id.
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fund business with the adviser in any event. That is, there is no way to
quantify the fund customers that would have inevitably sought out the
adviser for non-fund business in the absence of a prior relationship.
Even if quantified, investors face an additional hurdle in proving
that fall-out benefits result in a breach of fiduciary duty. Once fall-out
benefits have been calculated, courts subtract the costs incurred in pro-
viding the additional services.205 Courts then determine whether the
remaining fall-out benefits, when combined with "other circumstances,"
are sufficiently excessive to violate Section 36(b).2 06 What does and
does not constitute an "other circumstance," however, has yet to be
articulated. In light of the practical difficulties of obtaining and calculat-
ing information on fall-out benefits, this factor should be abandoned.
4. THE INDEPENDENCE AND CONSCIENTIOUSNESS OF THE
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
The final unworkable Gartenberg factor focuses on the indepen-
dence and conscientiousness of the board of directors. 207 Courts have
stated that the "expertise of the [board of directors], whether they are
fully informed, and the extent of care and conscientiousness with which
they perform their duties are among the most important factors to be
examined in evaluating the reasonableness of compensation under Sec-
tion 36(b)." 2 08 Assessing a director's expertise is usually a simple task.
For example, it is rather effortless for courts to explore a director's edu-
cational and business background. 2  Determining whether directors are
fully informed and exercise care and conscientiousness, on the other
hand, is considerably more challenging. This inquiry necessarily
involves looking into whether the directors participated actively in the
advisory fee negotiations by demanding information relating to costs
and revenues, selecting an accounting firm to analyze such information,
etc.210 Unfortunately, directors have been permitted to disclose their par-
ticipation level in vague terms. 21 1 They often recite the many factors
205. See Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 472, 494-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
206. Id. at 496.
207. Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816, 826 (8th Cir. 2009).
208. Krinsk v. Fund Asset Mgmt., Inc., 875 F.2d 404, 412 (2d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
209. See Schuyt v. Rowe Price Prime Reserve Fund, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 962, 978 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) ("[The directors were] well-educated and well-regarded members of the financial
community.").
210. See Dillon, supra note 180, at 300; see also Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 138
(explaining that it was over twenty years after the lower court's ruling in Gartenberg when the
SEC began to require mutual fund boards to disclose the material factors they considered in
approving advisory contracts).
211. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 138 (noting that the SEC did not require boards to disclose
the factors they considered in approving advisory contracts until over twenty years after the
original Gartenberg decision).
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considered but do not elaborate on how those factors were actually ana-
lyzed prior to settling on a fee.212 This superficial analysis by directors
comes as no surprise considering the fate of the directors of the Navel-
lier and Yachtman cases who lost their jobs as a result of meddling in
the affairs of their adviser. Thus, courts seeking to analyze this unwork-
able Gartenberg factor are merely reviewing a well-rehearsed script
between the board and their adviser.
B. Institutional Clients' Fees Provide the Necessary Benchmark
In Jones, the court of appeals dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint
because Harris did not "pull the wool" over the eyes of the funds' board
of directors during fee negotiations.213 Ironically, however, courts have
"pulled the wool" over their own eyes by ignoring the uncompetitive
nature of the mutual fund industry. 214 Due to this lack of competition, it
is aimless to compare the advisory fees of one mutual fund to those of
another in assessing potential breaches of fiduciary duty under section
36(b). Courts should instead compare the fees an adviser charges its
mutual fund clients to the fees it charges its institutional clients-for
whom the adviser must compete in an open market.
Institutional funds (pension plans, trusts, etc.) comprise a competi-
tive market for comparison because they are free from advisers' con-
trol.215 Institutional funds are independent from advisers because unlike
mutual funds, an adviser does not appoint their boards of directors. An
independent board of directors eliminates potential conflicts of interest,
allowing for arm's-length fee negotiations on the open market. A com-
parison to these funds would show that in charging "captive" mutual
funds substantially more, an adviser abstains from arm's-length bargain-
ing and thus breaches its fiduciary duty under Section 36(b).2 16
Critics of a fee comparison to only institutional clients advance two
prevailing arguments. First, they claim that the fees paid by mutual fund
and institutional clients establish a broad spectrum of what investors are
212. Id.
213. Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 635 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Plaintiffs do not
contend that Harris Associates pulled the wool over the eyes of the disinterested trustees or
otherwise hindered their ability to negotiate a favorable price for advisory services.").
214. See discussion supra Part I.A.
215. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 141; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 29, Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010) (No. 08-586)
("Because negotiations for [advisory fees to be charged institutional clients] typically occur
between independent parties, each of which is subject to competitive pressures, they may provide
better evidence of the prices that arn's-length bargaining would produce for the relevant
services.").
216. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 141-42.
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willing to pay.2 17 The theory is that although institutional clients may
pay less, they merely account for the lower-end of the spectrum. 2'8 If
there is a range of fees that different investors are willing to pay, institu-
tional investors paying a lower amount than mutual fund investors sim-
ply indicates that one investor is not willing to pay as much as the other.
The flaw in this argument is that it hinges on a faulty premise-that
the market for mutual funds is competitive. Indeed, Judge Easterbrook's
analysis in the Seventh Circuit Jones decision exemplifies this miscon-
ception. Judge Easterbrook contends that the mutual fund industry is
competitive due to the sheer number of funds, as well as their relative
ease of access. 2 19 He argues that thousands of funds compete and inves-
tors can readily search for them via the Internet.2 20 But again, because
the entire industry is contaminated by conflicted boards, there is no true
competition. 221 Although investors may have a choice among funds, the
funds come with an adviser-who can control the board of directors-
already strapped to them.222 The existence of a plethora of mutual funds
merely establishes that there is a surplus in captivity. Hence, institu-
tional funds do not form a segment of a broader competitive spectrum-
they are the spectrum.
The second argument critics assert is that advisers charge institu-
tional clients different amounts because they perform different services
for them.2 23 The court of appeals in Jones reasoned that different ser-
vices mean "different commitments of time." 224 However, in both
mutual and institutional funds an adviser manages a complex of stocks.
That the stocks may require marginally different services does not
explain a sizeable gap in rates. After all, stocks are "not inherently
harder to manage because the legal owner is a pension fund as opposed
to being a mutual fund."2 25
Comparing the fees an adviser charges its mutual funds versus its
institutional clients provides the necessary framework under Section
217. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No.04-C-8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Feb.
27, 2007) ("[T]he [fees] paid by different parties establish a range of prices that investors [are]
willing to pay.").
218. Id.
219. See Jones v. Harris Assocs., L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
220. Id. Judge Easterbrook attempts to bolster his argument by comparing the current state of
the industry to that of the past. Id. ("'At the end of World War I, there were 73 mutual funds
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission holding $1.2 billion in assets. By the end
of 2002, over 8,000 mutual funds held more than $6 trillion in assets.'") (quoting Paul G.
Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 J. EcoN. PERSP. 161, 161 (2004)).
221. See discussion supra Part I.C.
222. See discussion supra Part I.B.
223. Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 185.
224. Jones, 527 F.3d at 632.
225. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 110.
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36(b). The alternative-comparing one mutual fund's rates to another-
is to assess breaches in fiduciary duty via reference to a commonly-
flawed pool.
C. Adjusting Fees To Reflect the Economies of Scale
Assessing the economies of scale is a second way for courts to
determine if an adviser charges excessive fees under Section 36(b).
"Economies of scale" pricing is an economic theory that as a fund's
assets increase, its advisory fees per capita should decrease. 2 2 6 The the-
ory acknowledges that "it is not ten times more difficult for [an adviser]
to decide to buy 100,000 shares of a company's stock rather than 10,000
shares." 227 This is especially true among mutual funds because unlike
other types of funds, mutual funds rarely trade securities in their portfo-
lios. 228 Moreover, shareholders in mutual funds tend to be long-term
investors. 229 As a result, only marginal shareholder activity is likely to
occur on any given day.230 Each of these factors contributes to make the
cost of managing a large fund substantially similar to the cost of manag-
ing a small fund.
The presence of economies of scale in the mutual fund industry was
first documented by the Wharton Report in 1962.231 The Wharton
Report found that "[t]he relatively high rates commonly charged open-
end companies by investment advisers do not appear to be a conse-
quence of extensive services rendered to, or expenses incurred on behalf
of, mutual funds."232 Further, the study determined that advisers had
effectively concealed their realization of economies of scale by reporting
the cost of servicing individual investors rather than reporting costs in
the aggregate.2 33 Shortly after the Wharton Report was published, the
SEC conducted a similar study.234 The SEC study supported the major
findings of the Wharton Report. It reiterated that mutual fund advisers
consistently failed to pass the benefits of economies of scale on to
investors.235
Perhaps the overriding critique of the economies of scale theory is
226. See id. at 97 n.49.
227. Id.
228. William P. Rogers & James N. Benedict, Money Market Fund Management Fees: How
Much is Too Much?, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1059, 1120 (1982).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 104.
232. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 228, at 1120 (citation omitted).
233. Id.
234. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT
COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 89-2337 (1966).
235. Rogers & Benedict, supra note 228, at 1080.
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that it does not account for increased input.23 6 Critics argue that as more
money is invested, more advisers must be compensated, which leads to
additional fees.237 Stated differently, they contend that the advisory fee
increases because the cost of input-i.e., labor-increases.
Still, this argument is defeated when an adviser's actual job func-
tion is considered. The adviser is constantly deciding how to invest a
lump sum of money.23 8 Indeed, the whole purpose of a mutual fund is to
pool together separate shares. 2 39 Therefore, whether the fund consists of
$100 million or $200 million in assets, the adviser has to make an identi-
cal investment decision. Of course, as a fund's net value increases, so
does its potential losses. Critics may argue that an increase in potential
losses necessarily prompts an advisory firm to perform additional analy-
sis before making an investment decision. However, funds with the abil-
ity to charge excessive advisory fees are so large to begin with that they
already perform extensive research and analysis before committing to an
investment. Thus, compensating additional advisers as a fund grows is
superfluous, because regardless of the fund's size, the necessary
research and analysis has already been performed.
Even if it is conceded that a larger fund does somehow require
more advisers than a smaller fund, the increased cost of labor would not
justify a significant hike in advisory fees. Note that if a fund is charged a
1% fee, the fund is charged ten times more if it grows from $10 million
to $100 million. However, allocating additional advisers to the growing
fund does not substantially increase the advisory firm's costs. First,
overhead costs are, for the most part, already in place. The cost of rent,
lighting, etc. only increases marginally with each additional adviser that
is employed. Second, the alleged necessity for "additional" advisers
does not mean that ten times as many advisers are necessary. After all, it
is not as if an additional adviser is employed for every dollar invested.
At a certain point there can only be so many cooks in the kitchen.
Hence, if the advisory firm only slightly increases its cost, it should only
slightly increase its fee.
It is somewhat startling that more courts have not incorporated the
economies of scale into their analysis. Data comparing fees charged to
actual costs should not be ignored. Rather, courts should assess whether
an adviser's fee properly accounts for the economies of scale the adviser
realizes.
236. See Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 188.
237. Id. (arguing that economies of scale do not explain whether actual costs are declining).
238. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 130.
239. See id.
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D. Expanding Disclosure Requirements
As the Supreme Court noted, the debate over whether the mutual
fund industry is competitive is "a matter for Congress, not the courts." 240
To make the comparisons to institutional clients and the analysis of the
economies of scale useful, Congress must heed the Supreme Court's call
and require the mutual fund industry to expand its current disclosure
requirements. With this sort of industry-wide reform, which draws upon
the common-law principles of fiduciary duty,24 1 section 36(b) (and its
new two-pronged test) could be turned into the investor protection for
which it was intended. In order to achieve this goal, Congress will need
to address a major shortcoming of section 36(b), which is demonstrated
by both the Gartenberg standard and the Seventh Circuit's decision in
Jones.
The continuing theme in the struggle for finding an effective inter-
pretation of section 36(b) is an industry-wide lack of disclosure. Inves-
tors under both the Gartenberg and Seventh Circuit's interpretation of
section 36(b) are unable to make sound allegations regarding calcula-
tions that are pertinent to their claims.242 If the burden in section 36(b)
suits is to be carried by investors, advisers should provide investors with
the necessary information to carry that burden.
Under the current law, advisers are only required to present poten-
tial investors with operating costs of servicing a fund, shown as a per-
centage of the fund's net assets.243 Once an investor purchases a share
of the fund, the investor will no longer receive expense information. 244
Investors are only supplied with quarterly reports, which show the
beginning and ending number of shares as well as the value of each
share-without any indication of the amount of operating expenses
already netted against such value.245 Without itemizing the expenses
that are used in arriving at the net value, investors never know how
240. Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1431 (2010).
241. As previously discussed, under common-law principles, fiduciary duty in the context of a
fiduciary negotiating with its beneficiary when the fiduciary has an interest in the negotiation
requires the fiduciary to comply with two requirements. First, the fiduciary must provide
complete disclosure. And, second, the fiduciary must act fairly towards the beneficiary. See
discussion of common-law fiduciary duty, supra Part II.B; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (2003).
242. See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 327 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that investors failed to offer calculations regarding the relationship between fees and
services rendered); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., No. 04 C 8305, 2007 WL 627640, at *6-7 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 27, 2007) (noting that investors failed to offer calculations regarding economies of scale).
243. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MUTUAL FUND FEES ADDITIONAL DISCLOSURE
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much they are paying for an adviser's services. If investors are to play
any role in the safeguarding of their investments, whether in the context
of deciding where to invest or whether or not to file suit for excessive
fees, then they must be informed of what they are paying for the servic-
ing of their fund through expense disclosure reports.
In particular, advisers should be required to provide investors with
regular reports detailing the costs incurred in servicing a fund. These
reports should indicate the individual fees paid by each investor.24 6 The
expense information regarding these fees should also detail the various
expenses calculated in arriving at the total operating cost of servicing a
fund.247 Additionally, the reports need to calculate the reduction in the
cost per unit of servicing the fund which occurs due to savings from
economies of scale as the fund grows-the motivating force in Section
36(b)'s enactment. Therefore, under the new two-pronged test, investors
would have a point of reference in assessing the savings that their
adviser enjoyed as a result of economies of scale and whether or not that
savings was passed on to them.
Most importantly, the reports should be conducted by independent
auditing firms, which are forbidden to provide any other services to the
adviser, including auditing other funds. 248 The lead partners of the inde-
pendent auditing firm which audit a particular fund should be required to
rotate every five years with another partner so that the auditors' indepen-
dence is not jeopardized by a lengthy relationship with the adviser.2 49
With such a restriction in place, the independent auditors would not
become merely another paper tiger 250 like mutual funds' boards of direc-
tors.251 Once the auditors have conducted thorough audits and have
drafted a report detailing their findings, the reports should be compiled
246. Currently, advisers are not required to disclose to investors the adviser fees paid by an
individual investor. See Leist, supra note 71, at 285; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
supra note 243, at 13.
247. See John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, Mutual Fund Advisory Fees: The Cost of
Conflicts ofInterest, 26 J. CORP. L. 609, 669-70 (2001).
248. A major concern of investors is the fact that compensation consulting firms, which aid in
the fee-setting process, are often conflicted since they offer other services to the adviser. See
Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 730 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J., dissenting).
249. The accounting profession is subject to a similar restriction under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 103, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) ("It shall
be unlawful for a registered public accounting firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead
(or coordinating) audit partner (having primary responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner
responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit services for that issuer in each of the 5
previous fiscal years of that issuer.").
250. Paper tiger is the English translation of an ancient Chinese phrase used to describe
something that appears powerful but in reality is weak.
251. In Migdal, investors were concerned about the members of the board of directors serving
on between twenty-two and thirty-eight other boards of the same adviser. See Migdal v. Rowe
Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2001). Restricting independent auditors to
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into a listing with reports from other funds. These listings should be
published and distributed publicly to any interested investor.
By requiring an outside auditor to supply the reports, Congress
would mitigate the likelihood of biased reporting and increase investor
confidence while fostering competition among advisers. As Midgal and
Jones demonstrate, investors are not confident in the mutual fund struc-
ture.252 Therefore, requiring self-disclosure would not ease investors'
concerns. If disclosure comes from an outside auditor, investors would
be less likely to question the findings. Additionally, an outside auditor's
expense calculations would provide an unbiased account of the costs
incurred and would mitigate the dueling-experts problem that occurred
in Gartenberg.2 5 3 Investors would also act as an additional oversight in
the mutual fund structure by simply reviewing the unbiased reports. Fur-
thermore, the compilation of each fund's expense report into a consoli-
dated listing and the availability of these listings to any interested
investor would foster competition. With a convenient comparison of
each adviser's fee, investors would be provided with information that
would enable them to "vote with their feet" by investing with the adviser
who charges the lowest fee relative to performance, thereby increasing
price competition among advisers.
Any change in the mutual fund industry will undoubtedly face
opposition. Although critics of reform-presumably advisers (and their
lobbyists)-may assert that the case has not been made that the mutual
fund industry is in need of change, 254 both investors and advisers would
benefit from unbiased disclosure. Requiring advisers to make available
the information that is critical in justifying their fees is hardly a radical
change and is not so onerous as to restrict or cap fees. It is merely
requiring what consumers expect in nearly all transactions-an under-
standing of what they are paying for. And, considering the profits that
advisers are enjoying in the mutual fund industry, a detailed explanation
of the fees that generate those profits is warranted.255 Undoubtedly,
auditing only one fund and requiring partner rotation every five years will help to alleviate
investor concerns about the relationship between the auditor and the adviser.
252. Investors in both Migdal and Jones filed suit despite approval of the fee agreements by
the boards of directors. See id. at 327; Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir.
2008).
253. In Gartenberg, testimony from expert witnesses created doubt whether the adviser had
enjoyed profit margins of either 38.4% or 9.8%, or suffered a loss of $7.7 million. Gartenberg v.
Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1982).
254. See, e.g., Coates & Hubbard, supra note 7, at 213 ("Radical shifts in existing law, or for
sweeping new laws and regulations, are unwise on the ground that the case has not been made that
the existing framework for regulation of funds and advisory fees is intrinsically flawed.").
255. See Freeman et al., supra note 1, at 90 (noting that from 1983 to 2008, two of the top
three performing American stocks were mutual fund advisers).
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some financial calculations are susceptible to multiple interpretations,
and the disclosure reports will be no exception. But providing an inves-
tor (and possibly a court) with an unbiased look at the costs of an adviser
will allow for a point of reference, which could be deviated from if
presented with persuasive evidence to the contrary. Also, whether or not
the mutual industry is competitive, advisers could enjoy a reduction in
litigation fees if such disclosure indicates that their fees are not exces-
sive. 5 Although these reports will be an added expense to the opera-
tions of the adviser, it is a necessary cost to ensure fair dealing.
By mandating unbiased disclosure, Congress would give section
36(b) and the hypothetical two-pronged test the firepower it needs to
achieve its intended purpose. Although the Supreme Court's review of
Jones is a step in the right direction, unbiased disclosure is essential for
investors to fully air their grievances under any framework of section
36(b).
VI. CONCLUSION
In Jones v. Harris Associates L.P., the Seventh Circuit created an
unfair standard for determining whether a mutual fund adviser has
breached its fiduciary duty in charging fees to investors. Under the
court's relaxed standard-merely requiring honesty during fee negotia-
tions-investors faced an incredible challenge in bringing a successful
action against their fund's adviser.2 57 The principal flaw in the court's
analysis is that it does not account for the lack of competitive forces
among mutual funds or the lack of disclosure in the mutual fund indus-
try. Consequently, it fails to acknowledge that even if individual advis-
ers are honest during fee negotiations, all advisers can still breach their
fiduciary duties by charging excessive fees.
The Supreme Court acted prudently in vacating the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision. However, in doing so the Court should not have resur-
rected the Gartenberg factors. Four of the six Gartenberg factors have
proven to be unworkable and thus should be disregarded entirely.258 The
256. In 2003 and 2004, investors filed over 500 class actions and derivative suits against
mutual fund advisers. See id. at 155.
257. See Jones, 527 F.3d at 632 ("A fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but
is not subject to a cap on compensation."). This is especially true given that only one investor ever
made any headway in an action where a court applied the more stringent Gartenberg factors. See
generally Gallus v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 561 F.3d 816 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding that the lower
court erred by rejecting a comparison between the fees charged to the adviser's institutional
clients and its mutual fund clients). However, the plaintiffs in that case may have only won a
battle and not the war. On remand, the defendant adviser, Ameriprise, will be afforded an
opportunity to explain the disparity between the fees charged to its mutual fund clients and the
fees charged to its institutional clients.
258. See discussion supra Part V.A.
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correct analysis in excessive fees cases should proceed under a modified
Gartenberg test. The only two factors that should be considered are: (1)
whether the adviser charges its mutual fund clients a fee comparable to
what it charges its institutional clients-for whom the adviser must com-
pete for in an open market; and (2) whether the adviser has passed on to
investors benefits realized based on the economies of scale. But this new
test will only be effective if advisers provide investors with expansive
expense disclosure.
As it stands, the future of section 36(b) claims for investors is
bleak. Investors are forced to use unworkable tests to make allegations
with information that they are unable to obtain. But if investors were
provided with a proper test, focusing on meaningful comparisons and
factors, along with the necessary information, section 36(b) might
achieve the reform for which it was intended.
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